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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the current state of public health’s (PH) intelligence capability across 
State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions through qualitative analysis of 
current public health jurisdiction plans for the collection, analysis, product creation, 
dissemination and programmatic oversight related to public health inputs into the 
homeland security intelligence apparatus. An assessment was conducted using an online 
Plan Assessment Tool, or PLAT, that allowed jurisdictional public health leadership to 
provide de-identified responses. This assessment of 25 of the 62 federally funded SLTT 
public health preparedness programs indicates one impediment to the continued 
maturation of this new intelligence capability is the lack of codified plans. The results 
also suggest that while public health programs at the SLTT level do indeed have much 
room for improvement, there is a burgeoning intelligence capability within public health. 
However, to sustain and improve this emergent capability will require a national effort to 
create mission focus and centralized guidance. 
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A. A SCENARIO 
It’s 5:00 pm on a Thursday night. Jennifer, an epidemiologist with the Georgia 
Department of Public Health is preparing to make one final check of the State Electronic 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System. Known as SENDSS, this system allows 
epidemiologists to spot trends in health information related to signs and symptoms of 
patients who visit emergency rooms (ER), among other things. The system uses sets of 
predefined variables to “flag” activity, which may indicate disease outbreaks ranging 
from influenza to a terrorist attack utilizing anthrax. Recently, Jennifer, working with 
Georgia’s Health Security Intelligence (HSI) analyst, Jim, defined a set of criteria to flag 
signs and symptoms related to possible drug overdose cases presenting in the ER.  
Today, for the first time, Jennifer sees a spike in activity in this data set. The spike 
is related to two emergency rooms about 20 miles from one another. Five cases have 
presented with similar medical complaints over three days. Jennifer calls Jim to pass 
along the information. Jim, working in Georgia’s Fusion Center, known as the Georgia 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC), passes the information to the law 
enforcement representative. He, in turn, calls the local police department to notify it of 
this new activity.  
The investigation sparked by the intelligence Jim provides quickly identifies a 
new, highly potent drug being distributed in the area on which users, unfamiliar with the 
potency, are likely to overdose. Additionally, a gang new to the area is distributing this 
drug. Not only is the drug removed from the area, but also, gang interdiction activities 
begin almost immediately.  
While this scenario is fictional, the integration of health security intelligence into 
the homeland security mission has already begun. Florida, for example, has established a 
database that tracks pharmacy prescriptions, which may indicate the illegal activity. 
Similarly, a myriad of systems including Georgia’s SENDSS and Google’s “Flu Trends” 
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website (Googel.com, 2012) are actively used to monitor infectious disease outbreaks via 
the Internet. However, the potential related to health security intelligence is just now 
being realized. The opportunity exists for health security intelligence to be an integral 
part of the homeland security intelligence mission at the state, local, tribal and territorial 
(SLTT) levels throughout the nation. Public health’s involvement in the homeland 
security environment is just beginning to take shape.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
With the passage of Public Law 104-201, The Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act, on December 23, 1996, public health, as a discipline, began to see an 
emergent role for its practitioners, one that was highly divergent from its stated core 
mission of the time. The need for the public health discipline to prepare the nation to 
prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from attacks and other events, which would 
have widespread consequences on the public’s health, was a daunting challenge. With the 
anthrax attack of October 2001, public health’s role in the soon to be anointed homeland 
security (HLS) apparatus would truly come to the fore. Now, having just passed the 10th 
anniversary of those anthrax attacks, public health still faces challenges in demonstrating 
its utility beyond simple communicable disease surveillance and response.  
With an increased emphasis on the role of SLTT professionals in the HLS 
mission, the advent of the new capabilities, like the fusion centers, seemed to be an 
opportunity finally to begin to define Public Health’s role in HLS and improve its ability 
to participate in the HLS mission. This has not been the case. Although public health 
practitioners have access to a myriad of information sources providing both real time, raw 
data, and processed, oftentimes unanalyzed data, it has lacked the necessary formalized 
processes to ensure a continued maturation of intelligence related capabilities. Indicators 
as varied as increased demand for a certain pharmaceutical or significant increases in the 
number of individuals seeking drug treatment in local communities could be valuable 
early warning indicators of events, such as preparations for an attack with a biological 
weapon or an increase in drug trafficking in the area when processed through the health 
security intelligence lens. 
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Despite the potential added value of public health’s capabilities with the HLS 
environment, public health practitioners have often found themselves playing a limited 
role, especially as it pertains to the intelligence community. To participate more fully in 
the broader HLS mission, and more specifically, in the HLS intelligence community 
(HLS IC), a concerted effort by public health will be necessary.  
Recently, public health jurisdictions at the state, local, tribal and territorial levels, 
have begun to integrate the intelligence mission into their jurisdictions’ preparedness and 
response paradigm; yet, to what end? No current national guidance documents for the 
creation of a public health capability to contribute to the HLS IC mission, and no formal 
funding streams exist for the establishment and maintenance of these activities, and still 
no single overarching definition related to the collection of public health data for the 
purposes of intelligence. At this point, the public health capabilities related to intelligence 
are fragmented and immature. To become a more effective partner in the HLS IC, it will 
be necessary to develop the skills to analyze data as intelligence, create a framework by 
which health security intelligence can be fused with intelligence from the traditional IC, 
develop intelligence products for distribution and ensure the necessary processes are in 
place to measure, and ultimately, improve  the HSI capability. In creating a HSI 
capability, public health has an excellent opportunity to maximize participation in the 
HLS mission. First, however, the public health community must develop a concerted, 
formalized, HSI capability across all levels of the SLTT jurisdictions.  
C. THE CASE FOR A HEALTH SECURITY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY 
The emergent government paradigm now known as homeland security has been 
one fraught with organizational challenges related to the integration of the core 
components necessary to protect the United States from terrorism, whether domestically 
or internationally derived. At least 22 separate organizations now comprise the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the federal level (Light, 2007). SLTT 
partners further expand the number of entities that play a role in securing the homeland. 
Nowhere has this transition been more apparent than in the Intelligence Community (IC). 
The need to merge foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities quickly, once 
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considered necessarily separate, while incorporating new, non-traditional partners, such 
as public health, into one overarching HLS IC has created numerous culture clashes, 
organizational uncertainty and mission ambiguity. The incorporation of public health 
agencies into what has been a law enforcement dominated domestic intelligence 
community has further exacerbated the cultural shock and organizational upheaval that 
has occurred since 9/11.  
Public health agencies had little experience working with their counterparts in the 
law enforcement and intelligence communities, often resulting in frustrating interaction 
demonstrating little benefit to either side. Additionally, the public health role in the HLS 
IC was initially ill defined and widely unrecognized. Public health still faces a myriad of 
cultural, organizational and strategic issues related to its integration into the HLS IC. A 
2005 report by the National Governors Association found that,  
As emergency management and homeland security evolved, public health 
officials frequently found themselves at the periphery of preparedness and 
response efforts. This lack of integration into homeland security structures 
has been further hindered by a public health culture sometimes at odds 
with decision-making approaches favored by other first response agencies 
and a public health infrastructure that has lagged behind other response 
agencies in terms of involvement. (Mitchell, 2005, p. 1)  
Recently, however, this situation has begun to change. In 2007, the Office of 
Health Affairs (OHA) was established within the DHS with a mission, “…to protect the 
health and security of the American people in coordination and collaboration with other 
DHS components, federal, state and local partners, and the private sector…” (Department 
of Homeland Security 2011). Two years later, a key tenet of the National Health Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, published by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) in December of 2009 was to “Gather, consolidate, and 
retain raw data and information from human sources, observation, technical sources, and 
open (unclassified) or protected (classified) materials; analyze these data to identify 
trends, indications, and/or warnings of criminal and/or terrorist activities (including 
planning and surveillance)” (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
2009). In 2011, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published the 
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“Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local 
Planning, March 2011.” In that document, written plans for jurisdictions involved in 
information exchange with partner agencies should have, “Clearly defined intelligence 
requirements that prioritize and guide planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination 
efforts” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011b). 
While the need for public health’s involvement in the HLS IC is well established 
and efforts are being made to create a foundation for a concerted national Health Security 
Intelligence capability, much remains to be done.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How has public health responded to the need to create a Health security 
intelligence capability and what remains to be accomplished? 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Health security intelligence is still an emergent term, at best. The research 
literature related to public health’s involvement in the intelligence paradigm is sparse. 
Although frequent mentions of the need to involve public health in the intelligence 
collection, analysis and product development process have begun to appear in 
government reports, congressional testimony and related products, this author could only 
identify one federal guidance document that pertained directly to the implementation of 
public health and medical professionals in the intelligence space. This document focused 
on the integration of public health and medical personnel into the fusion center 
environment, not on how the public health sector should structure its programs to support 
and mature the HSI capability. By attempting to ascertain how public health programs 
have begun to establish, formalize, fund and mature their health security intelligence 
programs, beneficial contributions to the public health, homeland security and 
intelligence fields can be realized.  
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F. ARGUMENT  
1. The Case for Health Security Intelligence 
The public health discipline at the state and local level collects massive amounts 
of data on a daily, and sometimes hourly basis. Naratajan (2007) identified at least 25 
individual data collection sources accessible to public health practitioners at the state and 
local level (pp. 47–48). Additionally, federal public health agencies are rolling out new 
products, such as the recently redesigned Biosense program at the CDC, which augment 
or amplify these data collection activities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2011b).  
This information is used to establish long-term health trends, identify emerging 
infectious diseases, and even detect the presence of biological agents potentially linked to 
terrorist activity. Despite these significant data collection efforts, public health 
jurisdictions at the SLTT level have made little progress in establishing a formal 
capability to utilize these data streams as inputs into the intelligence process. Instead, 
public health jurisdictions have been content simply to maintain the status quo, even in 
the face of increasingly ample amounts of evidence that substantial contributions can be 
made to the intelligence community.  
The failure to formalize intelligence efforts in the public health field is not new. 
In his 1998 testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, International 
Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House 
of Representatives, Richard Davis, the Director of National Security Analysis, National 
Security and International Affairs Division, noted that public health, through the 
Department of Health and Human Services, was one of just five agencies charged with 
the development of various capabilities aimed at preventing or mitigating the damage 
done by a weapon of mass destruction (Observations on the Bunn-Lugar-Domenici 
Domestice Preparedness Program, 1998, p. 4). Since that time, the anthrax attacks of 
2001 have spurred numerous initiatives in the public health domain to increase its 
epidemiological surveillance capabilities. While critical to the public health mission, 
simply providing information to the existing HLS IC actors possibly indicating an 
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emerging infectious disease is no longer sufficient. For public health to avoid the type of 
shortsighted failures of imagination that the 9/11 commission found leading up to the 
attacks, it must move its intelligence efforts to the fore.  
Numerous opportunities are currently being lost due to the lack of a formalized 
HSI capability. From lack of inclusion in state and local fusion centers, to difficulty 
relating to other homeland security intelligence practitioners, public health has 
consistently failed to leverage its considerable expertise and experience to contribute to 
the intelligence process. Developing a concerted health security intelligence analysis 
capability, and training individuals in the public health domain to utilize HSI information, 
would do much to improve public health’s role in the HLS IC. Additionally, and perhaps 
most importantly, this capability would provide a dramatic increase the nation’s ability to 
prepare itself for manmade and naturally occurring events of public health significance.  
2. The Need for Maturation and Formalization 
A mature health security intelligence program must possess the capability to 
transform raw data and even information that has been processed but not analyzed 
through the intelligence lens, into a consumable intelligence product. Krizan states the 
intelligence process is comprised of many integrated and mutable components that 
include the following. 
 Needs 
 Collection Activities 
 Processing of Collected Information 
 Analysis and Production 
As the production of intelligence is inherently difficult, for public health to avoid 
failures in the intelligence domain, it must develop an intelligence community within its 





In their book, Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Sims and Gerber (2005) found that,  
Information shortfalls, notwithstanding, however, numerous studies of 
many if not most of the cases defined as intelligence failures in recent 
decades have demonstrated that they resulted as much if not more from 
what was or was not done with information that had been acquired—that 
is, how it was collated, interpreted and communicated. (p. 116) 
Hillen (1998) supported the issue of having an overreliance on the sheer volume 
of data collection rather than sound analysis in his 1998 article for the National Review. 
Public health faces just this kind of potential failure today. It has the ability to collect and 
interpret data for other public health practitioners, but it lacks the ability to analyze that 
information from the intelligence perspective and turn it into an intelligence product that 
will confer understanding and contextual meaning to those outside the public health 
domain, a potentially serious shortfall to say the least. Paul (2010) states, “Information 
does not typically come neatly packaged and labeled to indicate its subject matter or 
domain of interest. Information from one domain may prove valuable in another, often at 
a different time and in another form.” Information that initially surfaces in the public 
health domain may later be determined to have implications for counterterrorism, and 
vice versa” (Kshemendra, 2010, p. 7). The ability for public health to communicate its 
findings with other agencies or actors within the intelligence community and broader 
homeland security environment is of the utmost importance.  
3. The Need for Better Analysis 
In its quest to enter the intelligence community, public health cannot hope simply 
to transform its infectious disease practitioners, epidemiologists or other public health 
professionals into analysts by simply changing their job title. The analysis of intelligence 
is a learned skill. Analysts need both training and experience to become effective at 
transforming raw data and information into intelligence products. The intelligence analyst 
faces a broad series of challenges in interpreting the raw data provided. From 
interpretation to dissemination, the analysis of intelligence requires a skilled individual 
able to assess and reassess preconceptions, data inputs and new situational developments 
constantly. Current public health practitioners have little familiarity with the intelligence 
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cycle, the needs and requirements of consumers outside of public health, and lack the 
ability to package products in such a way to be interesting to and understood by those in 
the traditional homeland security community. As Lowenthal (2009) states, “Analysis is 
much more than sitting down with the collected material, sifting and sorting it, and 
coming up with a brilliant piece of prose that makes since of it all” (p. 112). To ensure 
that public health can contribute meaningfully to the intelligence process, it will need to 
ensure it builds the capacity to analyze its data as intelligence skillfully.  
4. The Benefits to Public Health  
The public health mission in homeland security has continued to evolve since 
2001. This evolution has seen increased calls for public health to participate in the 
homeland security intelligence community process. In a 2005 report published by the 
National Governors Association for Best Practices, outlining the ways in which public 
health could become better integrated into the HLS community, it was stated, “To better 
integrate public health into their homeland security structures, states should…include 
public health fully in homeland security intelligence and analysis” (National Governors 
Association, 2005, p. 1). 
Similarly, a key tenet of the National Health Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 
December 2009, is to “Gather, consolidate, and retain raw data and information from 
human sources, observation, technical sources, and open (unclassified) or protected 
(classified) materials; analyze these data to identify trends, indications, and/or warnings 
of criminal and/or terrorist activities (including planning and surveillance)” (United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, 2009, p. 24). Most recently, in the 
CDC guidance document, “Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards 
for State and Local Planning, March 2011,” it is stated that written plans for jurisdictions 
involved in information exchange with partner agencies should have, “Clearly defined 




dissemination efforts” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevenetion, 2011b, p. 59). What 
remains unclear, however, is whom in the public health domain would provide this 
analysis capability.  
Public health will see other benefits from developing the ability to interact equally 
with its HLS partners in the IC. Miller notes that although sharing of information is 
critical to the HLS community connecting the proverbial dots, “Homeland security 
leaders and practitioners that possess…desired information may be in a position to 
leverage this exchange value within the homeland security intelligence community or 
with other homeland security decision makers for political, organizational, or information 
advantage” (Miller, 2010, p. 62). Public health has a vested internal interest to being able 
to contribute to the IC and provide information valuable to its partners. Being able to 
provide this capability will not only increase the value of public health to the IC, but also 
will engender greater familiarity with non-public health HLS actors with public health’s 
capabilities and mission.  
5. The Importance of Written Plans 
Public health must continue to develop an intelligence capability internally. This 
process should start with the development of a written plan for a concerted HSI program. 
The plan should account for the need to train analysts, inclusion in the fusion center 
environment where applicable, oversight and accountability of the data, product 
reliability/usefulness, appropriate privacy protections and, when possible, identify and 
appropriate funding to grow and sustain the HSI program. Once established, the plans 
should be used as a living document, evolving to meet the continued needs of both the 
HSI and HLS IC, as well as account for the maturation of the program. Non-public health 
actors, working with trained health security analysts, will be able to leverage these 
resources in new and innovative ways.  
6. Privacy and Security Considerations 
Concerns of privacy and domestic surveillance have shown a remarkable rise over 
the last five years. The recent controversy revolving around cooperation between the 
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Central Intelligence Agency and the New York Police Department highlight the need to 
ensure transparency and accountability for the assurance of civil and privacy protections 
(Caray, 2011). As much of the data and information public health accesses is de-
identified prior to its being reported, the concerns about privacy should be relatively 
easily addressed. The state of Florida, for instance, recently rolled out a database for 
tracking prescriptions. This database is for use primarily to counter the illegal 
dispensation of prescriptions for controlled substances. While the database faced 
criticism from both privacy advocates and those concerned with cyber security, the 
concerns were ultimately addressed and the system was allowed to come online (Geggis, 
2011). The Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for the Florida Drug Prescription 
Monitoring Program indicates the site is compliant with both the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), as well as with the best practices of 
the cyber security industry (Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, n.d.). As the public 
health sector continues to develop and refine its HSI capabilities, transparency and 
considerations for both privacy and security must be given due attention. Transparency in 
how these two activities are being accomplished will need to be achieved for the public to 
feel comfortable with HSI.  
7. A Definition 
To advance this topic throughout the thesis, the author proposes and will 
demonstrate the term health security intelligence be utilized, recognizing the limitation of 
the term. To foster an understanding of the concept, he also proposes the definition of 
health security intelligence as information derived from the gamut of public health and 
medical data sources, which can be collected, analyzed, packaged as a product and 
disseminated as intelligence.  
It would necessarily follow then that a health security intelligence program is one 
that enables the collection, fusion, analysis, product creation, and dissemination of 
intelligence from sources public health practitioners and medical professionals access that 
may affect the day-to-day activities or security of the nation or national assets.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the framework upon which public health 
can continue to improve its HSI capability. Public health, as a discipline, still struggles to 
provide meaningful inputs into the HLS intelligence process. While a variety of 
contributing factors exist, the most predominant is the need for public health to begin 
formalizing and professionalizing its homeland security analysis component. A failure to 
begin to develop a formalized process, which includes a written plan and processes for 
HSI programs, could threaten to undermine public health’s role in the HLS arena 
altogether. Public health must create a framework to allow analysts to be provided with 
enough initial intelligence analysis training to make it possible for them to gain 
experience from interacting with other HLS IC practitioners, as well as benefit from 
follow on training in intelligence analysis. Concurrently, newly trained Health Security 
Intelligence Analysts (HSIAs) will need to work with their parent agencies to ensure 
development of the ability to synthesize raw data in such a way an analyst can identify 
and contextualize it. The literature on health security intelligence can be classified into 
six distinct areas: general state and local intelligence literature, literature concerning 
intelligence analysis, in a limited quantity, literature dealing specifically with HSI, 
literature in the organizational, managerial, information management and knowledge 
management spaces, literature addressing planning necessity, benefits and efficacy and 
finally, information related to privacy and security of information.  
B. THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
The state and local role in intelligence analysis is prevalent throughout the 
literature. The development of state and local fusion centers has proved a fertile ground 
for exploration of this topic. Connors and Rollins (2007) write, “Following this trend, 
fusion centers are evolving into one-stop shopping organizations that are responsible for 
analyzing all-hazards threat information, tracking asset location and operational 
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readiness, and issuing reports related to current, emerging, and future threats” (p. 3). 
Their contention is that fusion centers provide a perfect environment, as their name 
implies, for the synthesis of multiple intelligence types from many disciplines within the 
homleand security sector, at the state and local level.  
This concept is important to the public health role in the HLS IC as the vast 
majority of public health data collection occurs at this level. Without analyst training for 
public health at the state and local level, little hope exists of an effective health security 
intelligence capability. Osborne asserts it is critical to improve intelligence analysis at the 
state and local level through the development of a cadre of trained analysts. While her 
work is focused within the law enforcement community, its relevance to public health, or 
any other state or local agency involved in homeland security, is easily understood; 
analysts are not born, they are made, through training and experience. She also argues 
that state and local personnel numbers dwarf the federal government and a vast, untapped 
potential remains to provide intelligence analysis (Osborne, 2006). A January 2012 report 
by the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group (2012) most recently supported this 
notion by stating part of the DHS’s mission focus moving forward should be, 
“…integrating intelligence vertically through DHS elements; and working with 
state/local/private sector partners to draw their intelligence capabilities into a national 
picture and provide them with information” (p. 1). Providing HSIAs training consistent 
with the broader HLS IC will allow for a more rapid integration into the community, as 
well as help ensure the quality and reliability of their outputs.  
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALYSIS IN INTELLIGENCE 
Public health’s entry into the HLS IC will require a ground up development of 
capability. The intelligence cycle is complex, and as Miller (2010), citing Quiggin 
asserts, is comprised of multiple stages. “The production of intelligence is a three part 
process: 1) data is collected through observation, 2) that data is converted into 
information by analysis and the 3) analysis becomes potential understanding to an 
intelligence consumer through creation of a deliverable (report or briefing) that can be 
applied to a specific decision or problem set within the threat environment” (p. 17). In her 
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primer on intelligence, Krizan (1999) quoted Dearth as stating, “[I]n fact, the [process] is 
multidimensional, multi-directional, and—most importantly—interactive and iterative” 
(p. 8). Her graphic related to the intelligence cycle provides a more nuanced 
representation than Quiggin’s description and demonstrates the analysis process is not 
simply a one-dimensional production of raw data into an intelligence product. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Intelligence Essentials for Everyone (From: Krizan, 1999) 
Analysts must be trained to be cognizant of the myriad factors that can influence 
their production of intelligence. To this end, Richards J. Heuer’s work on the psychology 
of intelligence analysis spends a great deal of time examining the preconceptions and 
“mind sets” that drive analysts’ interpretation of events. “Analysts do not achieve 
objective analysis by avoiding preconceptions; that would be ignorance or self-delusion. 
Objectivity is achieved by making basic assumptions and reasoning as explicit as possible 
so that they can be challenged by others and analysts can, themselves, examine their 
validity” (Heuer, 1999, p. 10). For analysts to learn to challenge preconceptions, training 
and experience are necessary. Only through training and practice can analysts learn to 
accept and work through the psychological limitations of the human mind. To build this 
capacity, public health practitioners must develop familiarity with the intelligence 
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process at both the operational and leadership levels. This familiarity is particularly 
important for public health practitioners to account for, as many potential HSIAs 
currently conduct a very different type of analysis that will affect their ability to conduct 
analysis for the purposes of producing intelligence products.  
In his book, “Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise,” Edward 
Waltz (2003) describes a new era in which knowledge acquisition, management and 
manipulation become preeminent skills for the intelligence community, surpassing for the 
first time, the need to collect greater amounts of raw data that makes the ability to discern 
the valuable aspects of the collected information, the need for adept analysis, critical. 
Finally, Lowenthal describes the need for training and experience in techniques of 
analysis in discussing how to get through the vast amount of information at the analysts’ 
fingertips today.  
Sifting is not just a matter of getting through the accumulated imagery, 
signals, opens sources reporting and other data. It is also the much more 
important matter of seeing this mass of material in its entirety, of being 
able to perceive patterns from day to day and reports that are anomalous. 
There are no shortcuts. Sifting requires training and experience. 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 117) 
With the numerous public health data streams constantly feeding new information 
to public health professionals, Lowenthal’s work demonstrates the criticality of trained 
analysts analyzing the information through the intelligence lens. 
Another aspect of the literature that demonstrates the importance of analysis is the 
necessity for the consumer to trust the analysis, while understanding the limitations of the 
intelligence products. The Markle Foundation Task Force (2006) found, 
“…indiscriminate reporting of unverified information, without regard to information 
quality, reliability or usefulness, or without considering the receiving agency’s ability to 
analyze the information, is not the effective information sharing environment that is 
needed to contribute to better protecting the country from the threat of terrorism” (p. 19). 
The Director of National Intelligence (2007) similarly stated in his, “Intelligence 
Community Directive Number 200, Management, Integration and oversight of 
Intelligence Community Analysis,” referred to as the “capstone Intelligence Community 
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(IC) Directive (ICD) for Analysis,” that the policy memo states, “Sound Tradecraft is 
essential; without it, collaboration will be difficult and customers will lack confidence in 
IC judgments. Consistent attention shall be given to ensuring methodologies are sound 
and shared, the depth of analytic expertise is appropriate, and training is aggressive and 
continual and adheres to tradecraft standards” (p. 2). 
The policy memo further highlights the need for public health to professionalize 
its analysis capability. Ensuring that public health can produce trusted intelligence 
products, useful to the reader or policy maker, will be critical in its drive to further the 
public health aspects of the HLS mission.  
The final area within the literature related to the importance of intelligence 
analysis rests with the need to provide information culled from all the available agencies 
and resources to provide the broadest possible coverage of potential threats and hazards 
policy makers face. Toners (2009) work on situational awareness is salient to this area of 
the literature, stating, “To achieve situational awareness, the right information (without a 
lot of noise) is available at the right time, and the right person is prepared to receive it, is 
capable of analyzing it, and is then able to do something useful with it” (pp. 1–2). Public 
health’s effort in creating a new intelligence capability will require early work in not only 
identifying what type of personnel in the public health domain will become good 
analysts, but also a need to build a system wide capacity to integrate its data with that of 
other disciplines to create the ability to, “…do something useful with it.” To that end, 
Pritchett proposed a model of information fusion specifically for achieving this kind of 
fusion of public health information with that of the other HLS disciplines. Her model 
centers on the idea of creating information fusion and, “…demonstrates the need for the 
Public Health and medical community to improve collaboration across sectors to produce 
a more integrated product that enhances the understanding of the entire community…” 
(Pritchett, 2008, p. V). The Pritchett model provides an excellent tool through which 
HSIAs can process and integrate their intelligence products with those of other HLS 
disciplines.  
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D. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL INFORMATION AS 
INTELLIGENCE 
The literature related specifically to HSI is much less densely populated. 
However, the number of references for the need to create a capability for the 
incorporation of health and medical information into the intelligence environment has 
been increasing. The literature does not specify how to accomplish this capability, 
provide an overview of best practices, or describe metrics for the assessment of 
performance for those programs that have established one involving public health in the 
intelligence process. For instance, in 2009, the Department of Health and Human 
Services established the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS).  
This document clearly articulates the applicability of public health and medical 
information to the national security and homeland security missions, stating: 
…the health of a nation’s people has a direct impact on that nation’s 
security. Any large-scale incident such as a natural disaster or an 
infectious disease pandemic that affects the health of critical workers and 
compromises a society’s ability to provide food, water, health care and, 
more broadly, economic productivity endangers the security and stability 
of that society. (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
2009, p. 3) 
As the document is primarily focused on national strategy, it does not describe 
how the information related to these events should be operationally incorporated into the 
HLS environment or the intelligence arena. The Department of Justice (DOJ), along with 
the DHS’s OHA, jointly published a document related to the incorporation of public 
health and medical personnel into the fusion center environment. While this document 
referenced the need to assist public health and medical personnel in acclimating to the 
fusion center, it assumed the programmatic infrastructure was already in place within the 
public health jurisdictions. It also did not define criteria for a definition related to public 
health or medical intelligence or establish criteria that public health departments could 
use to guide development of a program.  
Natarajan (2007) first described a modern, public health centric definition for 
“domestic medical intelligence, “I propose that we define domestic medical intelligence 
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as that category of intelligence resulting from the collection, integration, analysis, and 
dissemination of natural and man-made psychological, chemical, biological, radiological, 
environmental, and agricultural information with a Public Health and health care focus 
that may influence the day-to-day activities or national security of the nation or national 
assets” (p. 76). This definition was based on previous work, mainly centered in military 
space. Since 2007, two competing terms, which could inform a consolidated definition, 
have come to the fore in the literature, biosurveillance and health security. 
Biosurveillance, as a term, is too limited to provide the overarching definition needed to 
incorporate all aspects of the data that can be gathered from the public health and medical 
fields for intelligence purposes. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a 2006 
report on public health infrastructure described biosurveillance as, “…automated 
monitoring of information sources of potential value in detecting an emerging epidemic, 
whether naturally occurring or the result of bioterrorism” (Government Accountability 
Office, 2005, p. 2). Health security is an emergent term that has undergone considerable 
evolution in the last decade. A 2008 article in the journal, Health Policy and Planning, 
explored the definition of health security, with the authors concluding no universally 
accepted definition exists for this term (Aldis, 2008). This author found additional 
literature related to this topic via review of policy memorandums, congressional 
testimony, guidance documents and other federal, state, and local products but nothing 
that definitively describes a definition or fully conceptualizes the public health entrance 
into the HLS IC.  
E. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
MANAGERIAL SCIENCES  
An important aspect of the literature, which is also underexplored related to 
creation of a health security program, is the aspect of fostering inter-organizational 
integration and information sharing. The organizational, information management, 
knowledge management and managerial science communities have much to contribute in 
this area. This area of research can play an important part in optimizing the contribution 
of public health. Additionally, this area of the literature can help inform the development  
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of plans, processes and policies that will assist public health organizations with 
engendering a sense of belonging amongst the more traditional HLS IC players while 
simultaneously improving the ability to share information effectively. 
An area of organizational and managerial science research with abundant 
literature available is related to the value of information sharing between organizations. 
The literature explores the costs and benefits organizations incur when attempting to 
broaden information sharing activities, the processes for assessing these costs, possible 
existing barriers to information sharing implementation, as well as how organizations are 
and can be structured to facilitate information sharing.  
The first area of this literature applicable to the HSI capability, and information 
sharing across the entire HLS IC, is the assessment of organizational qualities necessary 
to support an environment consistent with the ability to share information. Rocha and 
Miles (2009) state, “…value creation cannot be created without the commitment, trust, 
sharing of knowledge, and equitable rewards between the central node and the 
independent firms belonging to the network” (p. 451). 
Essentially, no expectation of information sharing between public health 
programs and the traditional HLS IC should be expected without first ensuring the 
qualities of trust, demonstrated commitment to the mission, the actual sharing of 
knowledge, and the established benefits of the contribution public health can make to the 
HLS IC. Similarly, Barrett and Konsynki (1982) found, “The participation levels increase 
in degree of participant responsibility, cost commitment and complexity of operating 
environment” (p. 95). This finding might indicate that if public health programs 
demonstrate a high level of commitment through, for example, dedicated analysis staff, 
development of a written plan, memorandums of agreement or understanding, etc., to the 
HSL IC, the information sharing returns should increase as well. Structuring the public 




A second area of the literature worth exploring is related to the costs and benefits 
of information activities. Dawes produced an excellent chart categorizing information 
sharing benefits and barriers. The three categories included the technical, organizational 
and political implications associated with information exchange, as seen in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.   Categories of Benefits and Barriers Associated with Interagency 
Information Sharing (From: Dawes, 1996). 
The table clearly defines a number of considerations public health programs will 
need to assess during the creation of their HSI Programs. By ensuring these issues are 
thoroughly reviewed during the planning processes, public health programs can better 
design their processes to foster information sharing.  
A third area of the literature, which adds value to the HSI, relates to the various 
studies related to interorganizational mergers and collaborations. While the literature in 
this field primarily focuses on private sector corporate mergers, much can be gleaned 
from the literature that can be leveraged in the creation of HSI programs. This area of the 
literature deals with the costs, benefits, results and effects of corporate merger and inter-
organizational collaboration. The research in this field can help manage participant 
expectations at the beginning of the HIS program implementation, as well as during the 
planning phase. For instance, Weber and Camerer (2003) found, “A majority of corporate 
mergers fail,” and that, “Participants express disappointment in the mergers' results, and 
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surprise at how disappointed they are” (p. 400). These findings seem to indicate that 
knowing that simply creating a well-structured planning document related to the HSI 
program and committing resources to the program that may not provide instant success 
may not be enough. Sustained effort related to the integration of public health staff, 
especially HSIA’s, and continued development and evolution of both the internal (to 
public health) and external aspects of the written HSI plan will most likely be necessary. 
Indeed, the Government Accountability Office (2007), when assessing the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security found, “…successful transformations of large 
organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take 
five to seven years to achieve. We reported that in successful transformations, 
organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more results-oriented, client- 
and customer-oriented, and collaborative in nature” (p. 2). Weber and Camerer (2003) 
continued to conclude that,”…subjects overestimate the performance of the merged firm 
and attribute the decrease in performance to members of the other firm rather than to 
situational difficulties created by conflicting culture” (p. 400). With the previously 
discussed differences in culture between public health and the traditional HLS IC 
organizations, great care will be necessary to guard against or overcome these types of 
perceptions or outcomes.  
The concepts of project management and collaboration also provide an important 
area of literature for the development and implementation of HSI programs. Doctrinal 
approaches to project management often require collaboration with stakeholders 
throughout a product development lifecycle. In other words, collaboration becomes a, 
“…strategic mode of integration in which two or more organizations cooperate on part(s) 
or all stages of production, from the initial phase of research to marketing and 
distribution” (Anderson, 1995, pp. 58–59). By employing basic project management 
concepts, throughout all phases of the HSI program development lifecycle, improvements 
and efficiencies in effort and enhanced outcomes can be achieved.  
Ultimately, the literature related to these areas of study can be a significant 
contributor to the development of an integrated HSI-HLS IC program. Those public 
health jurisdictions currently working on establishing a HIS program would be well 
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served to incorporate this knowledge into their planning activities. Those HSI programs 
already in the implementation stage should heed the literatures warnings regarding the 
difficulties of merging organizations and cultures, and seek to ensure their written plans 
and final HSI programmatic structure and processes account for these challenges.  
F. PLANNING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
The first area of the literature related to planning is filled with research to describe 
the planning process, its benefits and various impacts. Very little time is spent 
researching the necessity of developing written plans. The literature largely accepts the 
importance of moving through the process of creating the written plan. In a study related 
to establishing the relationship of strategic planning to firm performance for instance, 
Miller and Cardinal (1994) found, “Consistent with expectations, we found strategic 
planning to positively affect firm performance” (p. 1662). There Literature exists that 
describes situations in which the actual written document lacks the importance of the 
planning process itself, but it does not go so far as to conclude planning is not necessary. 
In this vein, the oft cited adage from former President and General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower stated, “Plans are nothing, planning is everything” seems appropriate. While 
the written plan may add value in creating a product that can help foster institutional 
knowledge, the act of going through the process of creating a written plan can be 
regarded as a critical first step in ensuring an HSI Program is well thought out.  
This process includes ensuring the HSI program has addressed key aspects of an 
effective intelligence program and developed the necessary framework on which to base 
future decisions. Rollins and Connors (2007) state, “Although often viewed as laborious 
and unexciting, theoretical foundations and administrative functions are crucial to the 
future success of a fusion center” (p. 4). This same statement may be applied to a public 
health program trying to implement an HSI capability. Without the foundational and 
administrative effort that goes into developing a written planning document, HSI 
programs are likely to overlook critical factors, such as the need for an inter-
organizational Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), fail to consider important aspects  
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of the program like the necessity of being able to demonstrate successes and 
achievements, and miss opportunities to mitigate problems that might arise during 
implementation, including HSI information safeguards and oversight.  
The need to ensure that a given organization can demonstrate both positive 
outcomes and quality assurance of its products is also well represented in the literature. In 
the intelligence community, the customer consuming the intelligence often decides if the 
intelligence product was effective or not. Lowenthal (2009) states four key metrics exist 
to measure the effectiveness of intelligence: timeliness, the degree to which the product is 
tailored to the consumer, how digestible the product was for the customer, and how 
clearly the intelligence described both what is known, but also what is unknown. Thus, 
the customer becomes the ultimate measure of how effective intelligence is and what 
becomes the focus of the intelligence collection and analysis process. Krizan (1999) 
supports this concept by stating, “Thus, customer feedback, production planning and 
tasking, as well as any internal product evaluation, all become part of the process of 
defining needs and creating intelligence requirements” (p. 19). An effective HSI program 
must account for a process that solicits and receives customer feedback. Developing 
consistent metrics related to customer perceptions of the intelligence products can be 
difficult and sometimes time consuming, but should be important considerations when 
attempting to establish a concerted HSI capability.  
G. PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY LITERATURE 
The need to ensure privacy protections for individuals, as well as secure the data 
that HSI programs use for intelligence purposes, is the final area of the literature explored 
for this thesis. The literature in this area comes from a variety of sources including 
government reports, academic research on data protection and reports by organizations, 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union.  
The accessing of data, which is entrusted to public health jurisdictions for the 
homeland security mission, presents a myriad of challenges. The data is often provided to 
public health for purposes other than the support of intelligence analysis capabilities 
related to homeland security.  
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Public health jurisdictions often work with a population that traditionally has 
distrusted the government. Butler (2002) states, “The presence of law enforcement 
officers has been thought to compromise the collection of sensitive medical information 
(e.g., illegal drug use). Indeed, some degree of separation from law enforcement may be 
advantageous for obtaining complete and accurate data during public health 
investigations.” By providing law enforcement and other partners access to sensitive 
public health information, HSI programs risk harming the traditional public health 
mission. Accounting for and implementing effective privacy safeguards in a written plan 
can help to demonstrate to the public that the necessary precautions have been taken to 
ensure their privacy, and also, provide HSIAs with a framework within which they can 
both provide and protect information to HLS IC partners.  
The literature also discusses concerns for the security of the data itself. The need 
to account for both physical protection of the information, and to protect it from 
electronic methods of intrusion, is a prominent area of the literature. The program 
manager for the information sharing environment notes, “The unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information as a result of the Wikileaks breach illustrates some fundamental 
failures to protect sensitive information properly and challenges our government to renew 
its focus on enhancing means for the secure and the effective use of information” 
(Kshemendra, 2011, p. iv). The literature on this topic almost universally advocates for a 
mixture of physical and electronic protections of information. 
Failing to account for these needs in the HSI’s programmatic development could 
lead to serious information security and privacy concerns that would have deleterious 
effects on the ability of public health to evolve and grow its HSI programs and 
capabilities.  
H. CONCLUSIONS  
The literature supports that public health has both the potential and impetus to 
continue its development related to HSI. This development, the literature suggests, should 
come in several areas. 
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 Overall formalization and maturation of the HSI capability 
 Emphasis on written plans for HSI 
 Continued development of analysis capabilities and analysts 
 Need to account for privacy and information security  
In addition to these areas of development, the literature described how an HSI 
capability would enhance the HLS mission, benefit public health’s HLS role, as well as 
its traditional capabilities and, finally, how areas of research, such as the organizational 
and managerial sciences, can inform this development.  
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Sixty-two jurisdictions currently receive federal funds under the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement. The PHEP Cooperative 
Agreement, “…is a critical source of funding, guidance, and technical assistance for state, 
territorial, and local public health departments. Preparedness activities funded by the 
PHEP cooperative agreement are targeted specifically for the development of emergency-
ready public health departments that are flexible and adaptable” (CDC—PHPR—
Funding, Guidance, and Technical Assistance to States, Localities, and Territories, n.d.). 
The 62 PHEP cooperative agreement recipients to whom funds were sent include all 50 
states, four major metropolitan areas (Chicago, Los Angeles County, New York City, and 
Washington, DC) and eight U.S. territories and freely associated states (American 
Samoa, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau) (CDC—
PHPR—Funding, Guidance, and Technical Assistance to States, Localities, and 
Territories, n.d.). The 62 jurisdictions cover the 10 department of health and human 
services defined regions.  
B. STUDY DESIGN 
This research conducts a comparative analysis of the literature regarding 
intelligence program smart practices in comparison to public health agencies written 
plans for these activities. The author developed an electronic Planning Assessment Tool 
(PLAT), specifically for this research, using Georgia’s online State Electronic Notifiable 
Disease Surveillance System (SENDSS). An Internet hyperlink to the PLAT was sent to 
the directors of the Public Health Preparedness programs awarded PHEP Cooperative 
Agreement funds in 2011 via electronic mail. Using an Internet interface, the PLAT 
responses were de-identified upon submission. The SENDSS platform includes tools to  
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provide data aggregation, such as response frequencies. Although some quantitative data 
analysis is possible with this platform, the PLAT is primarily designed to collect 
qualitative data.  
C. SAMPLE SIZE 
Twenty-five of the 62 contacted jurisdictions completed the PLAT, or roughly, 
40% of the contacted jurisdictions. Each of the 10 DHHS Regions was represented by a 
returned PLAT.  
D. PLAT DESIGN 
The PLAT assessed 27 total metrics related to the information contained in a 
jurisdiction’s written plan for its health security intelligence program. The PLAT was 
designed to assess the health security intelligence programs’ organization and structure as 
defined by the existence of a plan. One jurisdiction provided feedback via electronic mail 
indicating that although no written plan existed, the jurisdiction did have a health security 
intelligence program and provided responses to several of the questions. This information 
was included in the analysis. The PLAT will provide insight into how SLTT Public 
Health agencies and organizations are currently implementing their HSI programs and 
offer opportunities to provide recommendations for improvement.  
E. DATA ANALYSIS 
Information was analyzed through comparison of the PLAT information 
regarding HSI activities and the literature regarding traditional intelligence community 
data collection and analysis activities that was accomplished in two steps. The first step 
was to conduct a jurisdictional assessment of written plans, policies and procedures 
related to HSI. Utilizing a jurisdictional plan assessment tool, the PLAT, SLTT 
jurisdictions were able to input plan specific data. The second component of the policy 
review included a comparison of the acquired planning assessment data with the existing 
literature describing effective intelligence programs. Synergies in the two processes 
allowed for the analysis of the current HSI programs against existing IC best practices.  
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1. Results 
The questions in the PLAT were designed to elicit a response that would frame 
the current state of public health programmatic activity related to intelligence inputs for 
the HLS IC. No current national requirement or programmatic guidance document related 
to public health department’s intelligence activities exists. Although some statistically 
relevant information is available within the data set, the data was designed, and largely 
analyzed, through the qualitative lens.  
a. PLAT Questions 1, 2, and 3 
The first three questions in the PLAT were designed to assess the 
jurisdictions size, general location (as defined by DHHS region) and the development of 
a written plan.  
Question one asked, “Does the jurisdiction have a plan in place for a 
Health Security Intelligence (HSI) Program?” In total, 25 jurisdictions responded to the 
PLAT, with 19 indicating they did not have a formal, written plan for an HSI Program, 
while six jurisdictions did indicate they had developed a written plan for an HSI Program. 
Of the 19 jurisdictions that indicated they did not have a formal, written plan, five 
provided follow up responses to indicate they did have a HSI program, although they 
lacked a written plan. When information is included from these jurisdictions, it will be 




Figure 2.   Written Plan Developed 
Of those that indicated a plan was written, two were local jurisdictions, 
three were at the state level, and one jurisdiction indicating it had developed a plan that 
included both state and local jurisdictions. Of those that indicated no written plan existed, 
but an established HSI Program had been developed, all were at the state level. Questions 
two and three sought to help assess whether jurisdictional level or geographic location 
played a factor in the development of a HSI capability. Of the jurisdictions that 
completed the PLAT, whether indicating they had a written plan or not, 16 indicated they 
were state-based public health programs with three indicating they were local public 
health programs. The remaining six programs failed to indicate what type of jurisdiction 
to which they belonged. As the PHEP funded jurisdictions only included four local 
jurisdictions, it was expected that the remaining five jurisdictions were predominantly 
state level agencies, although the eight funded territories and freely associated states were 
also included in the PLAT assessment.  
b. PLAT Questions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 
Questions 4 through 10 sought to characterize the ways in which the 
health security intelligence analyst capability was being developed.  
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Question 4: Secret Level or Above Clearances by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdictions with a written plan: 3 of 6 
Jurisdictions without a written plan, but indicating 
an HSI capability exists:  
1 of 5 
Table 2.   Clearances  
Question 4 asked, “Does the jurisdiction’s plan indicate that all of the HSI 
Analysts have at least a secret level clearance?” Responses indicated that of the six 
jurisdictions with a written plan, three had analysts with at least a secret level clearance. 
Of those five jurisdictions with no written plan, but an existing HSI program, one 
indicated its analysts had a secret clearance. 
 
Question 5: Number of Personnel Designated as Health Security Intelligence 
Analysts 
Written Plan? 1–5 HSIA’s 5-10 HSIA’s More than 10 
HSIA’s 
Yes 2 1 2 
No, but a HSI 
Program 
1 0 0 
Table 3.   Health Security Intelligence Analysts 
Questions 5 asks, “According to the jurisdiction’s plan, how many 
personnel are designated as HSI Analysts.” Of the six jurisdictions with a written plan, 
two identified a single analyst, one jurisdiction acknowledged six analyst positions and 
two jurisdictions reported more than 10 analyst positions. Question 7 provides additional 
detail about what types of personnel. Of those jurisdictions that did not have a written 
plan, only one identified a dedicated HSI analyst.  
 
Question 6: Jurisdictions with Dedicated HSI Analysts:  
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  3 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability:  
1 of 5 
Table 4.   Dedicated HSIAs 
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Question 6 asks the question, “Does the jurisdiction’s plan indicate the 
need for dedicated, full time, HSI Analysts?” Of the six jurisdictions with a written plan, 
three indicated that the HSI analyst position was a dedicated, full time position. One 
jurisdiction without a written plan indicated it had identified a dedicated position to be a 
full time analyst.  
 
Question 7: Analysts are Full Time or Part Time  
Written Plan? HSIA’s Are Part Time: HSIA’s Are Full Time: 
Jurisdiction Has a 
Written Plan: 
1 2 
Jurisdiction Does Not 
Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI 
Capability: 
1 1 
Table 5.   HSIA Designations 
Question 7 asked, “What percentage of time does the plan indicate HSI 
Analysts are assigned to the HSI Program?” This question was intended as a follow on 
question to Question 6. The intent of the question was to differentiate between a position 
dedicated to an HSI analyst who worked a full-time workweek, and one that although 
dedicated as an HSI analyst, did not work a full 40-hour workweek. Of the three 
jurisdictions that answered yes to Question 6, two indicated that the position was a full 
time position with one of the jurisdictions indicating it was a part time position and two 
responding that the plan did not specify. Of those jurisdictions with a HSI program, but 
no written plan, that also responded affirmatively to Question 5, one indicated the 









Question 8: HSIA Disciplines Related to Plan Development 
 
Figure 3.   HSIA Disciplines 
Question 8 asks, “What type of personnel are assigned as analysts in your 
PH Intel Program according to the jurisdiction's plan?” Public health programs have a 
diverse mix of existing career fields that comprise the public health workforce to select 
from when seeking to fill analyst positions. Included in those career fields are physicians, 
nurses, epidemiologists, and environmental health specialists. All of these career fields 
involve the collection and analysis of data, whether involving direct patient care or the 
larger trends associated with the science of epidemiology. Additionally, PHEP grant 
funding has created a new set of general emergency preparedness staff personnel, many 
of whom have backgrounds in the military, law enforcement and emergency 
management. The PLAT found that of those jurisdictions that indicated a written plan 
was developed, five indicated that epidemiologists were assigned as HSI analysts, with 
four indicating general emergency preparedness staff members had been assigned to the 
analyst role. Other career fields indicated as being assigned as analysts included within a 
written plan were, environmental health specialists, nurses and Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS) staff.  
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Question 9, designed as a follow on question to Question 8 asked, “If 
other was selected, please indicate the working discipline of the HSI Analyst (e.g., 
Emergency Management, Law Enforcement, etc).” Among the positions identified as 
being utilized as analysts were law enforcement, legal staff, psychiatry personnel and 
toxicologists.  
 
Question 10: Personnel Hired as Analysts 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  2 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 
Table 6.   Hiring of HSIAs 
Question 10 asks, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate if HSIA’s are 
designated as such upon hiring?” Of the six jurisdictions with a written plan, only two 
indicated personnel were hired specifically to staff a HSIA position. Of the five 
jurisdictions without a written plan, only one indicated it hired personnel specifically to 
staff a HSIA position.  
c. PLAT Questions 11, 14, 15, and 16 
Questions 11, 14, 15, and 16 focus on the relationship that HSI programs 
have with their jurisdiction’s fusion center. The questions were designed to assess 
whether or not the level of interaction the jurisdiction had with their fusion center 
influenced HSI program development.  
 
Question 10: MOU With Fusion Center 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  4 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 7.   Fusion Center MOU 
 35
Question 11 asks, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate the need for a 
written MOU with the State or Local Fusion Center?” Of the six jurisdictions with a 
written plan, four indicated an MOU was identified in the plan. Of those jurisdictions 
without a written plan, but indicating a HSI program existed, only one indicated a MOU 
with the fusion center was an identified part of the program.  
 
Question 14: HSIAs Assigned to Fusion Center 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  3 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 8.   Fusion Center Assignment 
Question 14 asks, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate Health Security 
Intelligence Analysts are assigned to the fusion center?” Of the six jurisdictions that 
indicated a written plan was developed, three indicated that the HSI analyst is assigned to 
the fusion center. Of the jurisdictions without a written plan but indicating a HSI program 
existed, only one indicated an analyst was assigned to the fusion center.  
 
Question 15: Fusion Center is HSIA Primary Work Location 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  2 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 6 
Table 9.   HSIA Work Location 
Question 15 is a follow on question to Question 14 and asks, “Does the 
jurisdiction's plan indicate the Fusion Center is the primary work location for HSI 
Analysts?” Of the six jurisdictions that indicated a written plan had been developed, only 
two indicated that the HSIA was assigned full time to the fusion center. Of the five 
jurisdictions without a written plan, but indicating a HSI program existed, only one 




Question 16: HSIAs at Fusion Center Full/Part Time 
Full Time: 2 Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  
Part Time: 0 
Full Time: 0 Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: Part Time: 1 
Table 10.   Percentage of Time 
Question 16 was an extension of Question 15 and asked, “If the 
jurisdiction's plan indicates that HSI Analysts are assigned to the Fusion Center, what 
percentage of time are HSI Analysts assigned to the center, according to the plan?” Of the 
six jurisdictions indicating a written plan existed, only two indicated that the plan 
specified the amount of time the HSIA was assigned to the fusion center and both were 
assigned full time. Of those five jurisdictions indicating a HSI program existed, but did 
not have a written plan, only one indicated that the HSIA was assigned to the fusion 
center for a fixed period of time and that jurisdiction indicated the HSIA was assigned 
only part time.  
d. PLAT Questions 12 and 13 
PLAT Questions 12 and 13 focused on the level and types of training 
HSIAs are provided in the HSI program.  
 
Question 12: HSIAs Attend Formal Training 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  2 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 11.   HSIA Training 
Question 12 asks, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate HSI Analysts 
should attend formal Intelligence Analysis Training?” Of the six jurisdictions that had a 
written plan, two indicated the plan identified the need for HSIAs to attend training. Of 
those jurisdictions without a written plan, but that indicated a HSI program was in place, 
one identified consideration of the need for HSIAs to have formal training.  
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Question 13: Training Curriculum Identified 
FLETC 
IFCAT 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  
Locally Developed Training 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
Locally Developed Training 
Table 12.   HSIA Training Curricula 
Question 13 was a follow on question to Question 12 and asked, “List any 
formal training courses or programs that the jurisdiction's plan indicates Health Security 
Intelligence Analysts attend.” No formal courses were identified by the name of the 
course; instead, two formal training programs were identified by name, the program at 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center or FLETC, which, “…serves as an 
interagency law enforcement training organization for 90 Federal agencies. The FLETC 
also provides services to state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement agencies” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.a). The other program identified was the 
Intermediate Fusion Center Analyst Training Program or, IFCAT, which is a, “…125-
hour intermediate analyst training program was developed following a nationwide fusion 
center analyst job task analysis and meetings with subject-matter experts from throughout 
the country” (Fusion Center Training, n.d.). One additional jurisdiction responded that 
locally sourced training opportunities were utilized, but did not provide further clarity. 
Finally, two jurisdictions provided general responses referencing training being provided, 
but added no additional clarity.  
e. PLAT Questions 17, 18 and 19 
Questions 17 through 19 sought to determine what public health data 
sources were being leveraged by HSI programs as inputs into the intelligence process. 
Additionally, Questions 18 and 19 sought to determine previously unidentified additional 
sources of public health data in the literature that HSI programs were assessing as 
potential sources of intelligence.  
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Question 17 asked, “How many sources of public health data does the plan 
indicate are included in the Health Security Intelligence Analysis Process?” Question 17 
only elicited one response by a jurisdiction with a plan. That jurisdiction did indicate its 
plan identified at least 10 sources of public health data for use in its HSI program. Every 
other jurisdiction with either a written plan or a self identified HSI program declined to 
indicate how many sources of data were identified for use in their HSI program.  
Question 18 asked, “What sources of public health data does the 
jurisdiction's plan indicate are included in your Health Security Intelligence Analysis 
Process?” Question 18 had a much greater response rate than Question 17 with all six of 
the jurisdictions with a written plan responding and two of the five public health 
jurisdictions without a written plan, but a self identified HSI program adding a response. 
Additionally, Question 18 helped to provide greater clarity related to the number of data 
sources being used by the jurisdictions, with at least five of the six jurisdictions with a 
written plan using five or more data sources, and two of the five jurisdictions without a 
written plan but indicating a HSI capability using more than five data sources.  
Question 18: HSIA Data Sources Currently Utilized 
 
Figure 4.   HSIA Data Sources 
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Question 19 was designed to gather additional information about sources 
of data outside the options from Question 18. None of the surveyed jurisdictions 
identified any additional sources of data as being incorporated either into their plans or as 
part of a self identified HSI programs. It is doubtful to this author that the PLAT captured 
every possible source of HSI data currently being used for HSI by the responding 
programs. Unfortunately, the limits of the PLAT confound the ability to collect additional 
data from specific organizations.  
f. PLAT Questions 20, 21 and 22 
Questions 20, 21 and 22 sought to determine how the HSI, once processed 
into a product for dissemination, was vetted before release.  
 
Question 20: Vetting Process of HSIA Products 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  4 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 13.   Vetting Process 
Question 20 asked, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate a clearance 
process for vetting of intelligence products before their final release?” Four of the six 
jurisdictions indicating a written plan existed stated an information clearance/vetting 
process was identified in the plan. Of those jurisdictions without a written plan, but 
indicating a HSI program existed, one indicated a clearance/vetting process existed.  
Question 21 was designed as a follow on question to Question 20 and 
asked, “If yes, who (list position title) is responsible for final approval of the Health 
Security Intelligence product according to the jurisdiction's plan?” Of the six jurisdictions 
with an identified plan, four of the six indicated a specific position was identified in the 
plan to provide for the clearance/vetting of intelligence products before release. Only two 
of the five jurisdictions without a written plan, but indicating a HSI capability, identified 
specific positions with this responsibility. Ensuring a position is identified in a written 
plan can help ensure consistency of process regardless of personnel change.  
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Question 22: Oversight Process for HSI Program 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  4 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
0 of 5 
Table 14.   Oversight Process 
Questions 22 asks, “Does the jurisdictions plan indicate a formal oversight 
capability exists specifically for the HSI Program?” Of the six jurisdictions indicating a 
written plan exists, four indicated an oversight process was identified in the plan. Of 
those jurisdictions without a written plan, but indicating a HSI program existed, none 
indicated a formal oversight process was in place.  
g. PLAT Question 23 and 25 
Question 23 focused on safeguards for information security and 
counterintelligence being incorporated into the written plan. Question 25, meanwhile, 
considered the unique (to the HLS IC) needs of HSI programs to safeguard protected and 
privileged health information as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Protection Act of 1996 (commonly referred to as HIPPA).  
 
Question 23: Information Security and Counterintelligence 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  4 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 15.   Oversight and Security Considerations 
Question 23 asked, “Does the jurisdiction's plan include internal 
safeguards for information security and counterintelligence?” Of the six jurisdictions that 
indicated a written plan, four indicated the plan accounted for ensuring information 
security and counterintelligence. Of the five jurisdictions without a written plan, but 
identified a HSI program existed, only one indicated the program accounted for 
information security and counterespionage.  
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Question 25: HIPAA Considerations 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  6 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
2 of 5 
Table 16.   HIPAA 
Questions 25 asked, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate a capability 
exists to maintain compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996?” Of the six jurisdictions that indicated a written plan was developed, all six 
indicated that the plan accounted for the need to maintain HIPAA compliance. Of the five 
jurisdictions without a written plan but indicated a HSI program existed, only two 
indicted the program had a capability built in to maintain HIPAA compliance. It should 
be noted that the while data streams being utilized in the HSI program have strong 
implications for the need to maintain HIPAA compliance, if no identifiable health 
information is utilized, HIPAA would be of less concern.  
h. PLAT Question 24 
PLAT Question 24 focused on the need to be able to process and distribute 
unclassified versions of HSI products as necessary.  
 
Question 24: Distribution of Unclassified Products 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  4 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 17.   Distributing Unclassified Products 
Question 24 asked, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate a process is in 
place to distribute unclassified versions of the HSI Products?” Of the six jurisdictions 
with a written plan, four had identified a process for distributing unclassified versions of 
their HSI products, of those jurisdictions without a written plan, but which had 
indentified a HSI program existed, only one indicated a process was in place to distribute 
unclassified versions of its HSI products.  
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i. PLAT Questions 26 and 27 
Questions 26 and 27 focused on the issue of funding the HSI capability at 
the state and local level.  
 
Question 26: Funding the HSI Program 
Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  2 of 6 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
1 of 5 
Table 18.   HSI Funding 
Question 26 asked, “Does the jurisdiction's plan indicate a formal funding 
stream exists to support the HSI program?” Of the six jurisdictions that indicated a 
written plan existed, only two indicated a formal funding source was identified in the 
plan. Of the five jurisdictions that did not have a written plan, but indicated a HSI 
program was in place, only one indicated an identified funding source existed.  
 
Question 27: Funding Source Identified 
Status of HIS Program: Funding Source: 
PHEP Jurisdiction Has a Written Plan:  
PHER 
Jurisdiction Does Not Have a Written Plan, but 
Identified a HSI Capability: 
PHEP 
Table 19.   Funding Sources 
Question 27 was a follow up question to Question 26, it asked, “If the 
jurisdiction's plan indicated a formal funding stream was associated with this activity, 
please indicate what funding stream was outlined in the plan.” Of the two jurisdictions 
with a written plan and that indicated a formal funding source had been identified, one 
indicated the funding came from the PHEP grant described earlier in this thesis. The 
second indicated the funding came from the Public Health Emergency Response (PHER) 
grant, a program that had now been ended. The one jurisdiction without a written plan 
that identified a formal funding stream also cited the PHEP grant.  
 43
2. Summary of Analysis 
The analysis indicates that jurisdictions with a written plan were more likely to 
have considered more of the areas of a mature HSI program, as indicated by the 
literature, than those without a plan. The analysis showed jurisdictions with plans were 
more likely to do the following.  
 Have a greater number of trained HSI analysts employed full time 
 Possess a greater number of personnel with at least secret level clearances 
 Have accounted for information security and privacy concerns, as well as 
ensuring their activities were compliant with HIPAA  
 Engage a broader cross section of public health personnel to contribute to 
the HSI production process 
 Utilize a greater number of data sources as intelligence inputs  
The analysis of the PLAT also indicates that numerous opportunities for 
additional research related to how public health jurisdictions are responding to the HSI 
mission exist. Specifically, an attempt to gather a larger number of the jurisdictions to 
achieve a greater statistical confidence interval would allow for statistical and 
quantitative analysis of HSI activities across the SLTT landscape. Additional 
jurisdictions contributing to the research would substantially improve the clarity related 
to HSI programmatic activities across the country. That being said, the results are likely 
qualitatively representative enough to draw some initial conclusions and formulate 
recommendations. Chapter IV includes the findings related to the analysis of the PLAT.  
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IV. FINDINGS 
A. PLAT QUESTIONS 1, 2, AND 3 
1. Findings Related to Planning 
The data from the PLAT suggest that the majority of public health programs at all 
SLTT levels have yet to develop written plans to address a HSI capability. The PLAT 
responses seem to suggest that those jurisdictions with written plans tended to address 
more of the areas the literature identified as critical to the success of an intelligence 
program. A written plan is often the precursor to a well-developed program. Although 
formalization of process is only one indicator of maturity for a program, planning has 
been demonstrated to be important to positive operational performance. Miller and 
Cardinal (1994) found, “…planning affects performance equally in large and small and 
capital-intensive and labor-intensive firms. Consistent with our original arguments, it 
appears that small firms and labor-intensive firms can benefit from the adaptation aspect 
of strategic planning” (p. 1662). The low number of jurisdictions indicating a written plan 
had been developed demonstrates the lack of consistent programmatic development for a 
HSI capability across the nation. As the literature review indicated, a distinct absence of 
national level guidance or doctrine for the development of a national capability exists. 
The one guidance document identified during the literature review, “Health Security: 
Public Health and Medical Integration for Fusion Centers,” focuses on ways in which 
fusion centers could incorporate a public health component into their environment, not on 
how public health programs should build out this capability either strategically or 
programmatically (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2011). It should be 
noted that this is not a weakness in the DOJ document, simply a recognition of the scope 
of the document.  
A variety of factors may contribute to the variation in the level of programmatic 
development and maturation across the country. As the literature indicates the need for a 
HSI capability has been recognized predominantly at the federal level, involvement of 
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federal regional emergency coordinators from the DHHS or the DHS (they share the 
same established regions), may play a factor in how much emphasis is placed on the 
formalization and maturation of the HSI capability in that region. 
Local factors, such as interorganizational relationships, whether positive or 
negative, also likely play a role in the differentiation in capability amongst the 
jurisdictions. Additionally, involvement of public health in state and local fusion centers 
(explored later in the analysis) may also contribute to the variance.  
2. Findings Related to Geography and Jurisdiction  
Geographically, no significant variation in the development of HSI capabilities 
across the nation seems to exist. It is interesting to note that three of the regions located 
on the East Coast have developed plans, but the limitations of the data set make it unclear 
as to what this may indicate, if anything. Additionally, Region VIII was the only region 
to report no established HSI Program existed, whether indicated by a plan or not.  
 
PLAT Responses Geographic Breakdown 
HHS Region Number of Responses Percentage Number of Plans 
by Region 
I 4 16% 1 
II 1 4% 0* 
III 3 12% 1 
IV 4 16% 1* 
V 3 12% 0* 
VI 2 8% 2 
VII 1 4% 0* 
VIII 2 8% 0 
IX 1 4% 1 
X 1 4% 0* 
Not Indicated 3 12% 0 
*Indicates one or more jurisdictions indicated a HSI Program existed, while not having a written plan 
developed. 
Table 20.   Geographic Distribution of Developed Plans 
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B. PLAT QUESTIONS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, AND 10 
1. Findings Related to Security Clearances 
The analysis of these questions indicated that a lack of security clearances among 
those individuals tasked with conducting health security intelligence analysis that may be 
indicative of a lack of clearances in the public health community in general. It is 
important to note that jurisdictions with written plans were more likely to have HSIAs 
with secret or above security clearances.  
As the classification of information has seen a dramatic rise in the last decade, 
failure to ensure HSI analysts have clearances of at least the secret designation will 
hinder their ability to act as a full partner in the intelligence cycle. In the face of 
numerous reports calling for the imposition of limits on the classification of documents, 
the number of classifications continued to rise in the middle part of the decade. In 2001, 
approximately 8 million classification actions were taken to protect intelligence, which 
had risen to 14 million by 2005, despite the 9/11 Commission calling for a decrease in the 
number of classifications just three years earlier (Committee on Homeland Security, 
2009, p. 1). While the number of classifications rose, the number of declassifications 
dropped with the Congressional Research Service finding that the, “…quantity of 
declassified pages dropped from 100 million in 2001 to 29 million in 2005” (Relyea, 
2007, Summary). As recently as 2008, a report from the office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (2008) found that the myriad classification guidance documents developed 
by the various agencies, the limited guidance on when designating something as 
unclassified is acceptable and conflicting direction from higher authorities, leads the 
personnel charged with designating information as classified or not, simply to default to 
the most stringent form of protection. Since 2008, numerous Presidential Executive 
Orders, guidance documents from the Director of National Intelligence and reports from 
Congress have indicated that efforts to reform the classification process have provided 




accessible in an unclassified format, it is problematic that the analysis of the PLAT 
indicates that most of the responding jurisdictions did not have an HSIA with at least a 
secret level clearance.  
2. Findings Related to the Numbers, Types and Employment Status of 
HSIAs 
Jurisdictions with written plans indicated a greater number of personnel 
designated as HSIAs within their programs, as well as a greater diversity of public health 
specializations filling analyst roles. The existing public health workforce offers a diverse 
mix of existing career fields to select from when seeking to fill analyst positions. Those 
career fields include physicians, nurses, epidemiologists, environmental health specialists 
and a relatively new cadre of personnel focused specifically on the emergency 
preparedness mission. Additionally, many public health departments include the EMS 
community or work closely with this community. All of these career fields involve 
collection and analysis of data, whether involving direct patient care or searching for 
larger public health trends that may indicate threats to the public’s health. A 2008 report 
assessing the identification of intelligence analysts within the law enforcement 
community indicated that a mix of trained police officers and general dedicated 
intelligence analysts represented an effective mix of personnel (Davis et al., 2010, p. 67). 
The PLAT identified six professions most commonly assigned as HISAs within public 
health jurisdictions. The following tables provide a general overview of the position 
responsibilities and describe potential reasons these practitioner types may lend 










Potential of Existing Public Health and Medical Positions as HSIAs 
Discipline Position Description Applicability to HSIA Position 
Epidemiologists Epidemiologists investigate and describe the 
causes and spread of disease, and develop the 
means for prevention or control. Applied 
epidemiologists, who usually work for state 
health agencies, respond to disease outbreaks, 
determining their causes and helping to contain 
them. Research epidemiologists study diseases in 
laboratories and in the field to determine how to 
prevent future outbreaks (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2010/2011d). 
Analytical skills, familiarity with 
biological threats to public 
health, generally excellent 
relationships with the wider 
healthcare community, high 
levels of education and training, 
expertise in working with data, 
sifting, and creating products to 
succinctly present information. 
Registered Nurse Registered nurses (RNs), …treat patients, educate 
patients and the public about various medical 
conditions, and provide advice and emotional 
support to patients' family members. RNs record 
patients' medical histories and symptoms, help 
perform diagnostic tests and analyze results, 
operate medical machinery, administer treatment 
and medications, and help with patient follow-up 
and rehabilitation (U.S. Department of Labor, 
2010/2011f). 
Interpersonal skills, general 
medical knowledge covers a 
wide range of topics, ability to 
work vertically and horizontally 
in a hierarchy, generally 
excellent contacts within the 
broader medical community, 
familiarity with generating status 




Environmental scientists and specialists use their 
knowledge of the natural sciences to protect the 
environment by identifying problems and finding 
solutions that minimize hazards to the health of 
the environment and the population. They analyze 
measurements or observations of air, food, water, 
and soil to determine the way to clean and 
preserve the environment…They also write risk 
assessments, describing the likely affect of 
construction and other environmental changes; 
write technical proposals; and give presentations 
to managers and regulators (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2010/2011c). 
Threat assessment skills, 
considerable expertise in 
working with data sets, 
experience developing reports 
and products, which include both 
supportable data, as well as 
critical analysis, often well-
developed community contacts.  
EMS Providers EMTs and paramedics assess the nature of the 
patient's condition, while trying to determine 
whether the patient has any pre-existing medical 
conditions. Following protocols and guidelines, 
they provide emergency care and transport the 
patient to a medical facility. EMTs and 
paramedics operate in emergency medical 
services systems where a physician provides 
medical direction and oversight (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2010/2011b).  
Familiarity with high stress 
environments, contacts within the 
first response community at the 
SLTT level, experience writing 
reports, making educated 
assessments and deciding on 
courses of action with limited 
data, ability to work across 
disciplines.  
 50
Potential of Existing Public Health and Medical Positions as HSIAs 





The Public Health Preparedness discipline is 
relatively knew but practitioner responsibilities 
include development of emergency response 
plans, coordination of emergency preparedness 
and response operations, development of 
mitigation strategies related to public health 
threats spanning the gamut of threats the public 
may face and development of programs and 
projects to incorporate threat. Hazard and 
vulnerability assessments.  
Often personnel have previous 
experience in law enforcement, 
the military, other public health 
professions, experience working 
with threat, hazard and 
vulnerability data, expertise in 
creating descriptive products 
related to possible public health 
threats, generalist, possibly less 
subject to cognitive bias 
developed during training and 
education for discipline.  
Table 21.   Possible HSIA Disciplines 
Other Disciplines to Consider as HSIAs 
Discipline Position Description Applicability to HSIA Position 
Laboratorians Clinical laboratory technologists evaluate test 
results, develop and modify procedures, and 
establish and monitor programs, to ensure the 
accuracy of tests. Some technologists supervise 
clinical laboratory technicians (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2010/2011a) 
High levels of education and 
training, high levels of expertise 
in specialized areas related to 
potential public health threats, 
experience working with data sets 
and generating reports, 
familiarity with quality assurance 
and control principles and 
practices which may add value in 
the intelligence creation cycle.  
Physicians Physicians and surgeons diagnose illnesses, 
prescribe and administer treatment for people 
suffering from injury or disease. Physicians 
examine patients, obtain medical histories, and 
order, perform, and interpret diagnostic tests. 
They counsel patients on diet, hygiene, and 
preventive healthcare (U.S. Department of Labor, 
2010/2011e). 
Diagnostic and treatment skills, 
profession generally trusted 
(important for integration into the 
HLS IC), very high level of 
education and training, ability to 
assemble disparate bits of 
information into reasoned and 
supported analysis. 
Table 22.   Other Potential HSIA Disciplines 
The PLAT found that very few public health jurisdictions hire personnel 
specifically to employ them as HSIAs. Question 10 did not garner enough responses to 
provide any meaningful interpretation. A variety of factors may contribute to the low 
numbers of personnel formally hired as HSIAs including a lack of funding dedicated to 
the HSI capability, relative newness of the HSI paradigm and inability to dedicate an 
position to the HSIA process full time. It is important to assess this area; however, one 
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indication of a maturing, formalized HSI program could be the employment of analysts 
vetted during the interview process for their appropriateness to the position. The simple 
appointment of existing staff members to analyst positions may or may not provide 
optimal results.  
HSIAs hired directly into the position may be more likely to have preexisting 
training in intelligence analysis, have awareness of issues like cognitive biases, and be 
better suited to interact with other analysts in a shared environment like a fusion center. 
Additionally, directly hired HSIAs would need less time to implement the kind of 
programmatic actions necessary to align traditional public health data collection with the 
HSI process. This hiring could be beneficial in the more immediate demonstration of the 
utility of HSI to the core HLS IC mission, engender trust with the traditional HLS IC 
actors in the jurisdiction, and assist the public health jurisdiction’s leadership with 
establishing greater ties to the existing HLS IC apparatus in place. 
The PLAT also found that of those personnel identified as HSIAs, very few 
operate as analysts full time. The need for dedicated, full time analysts available during 
the standard 40-hour workweek is well established. In her book, Out of Bounds, 
Innovation and Change in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis, Deborah Osborne 
notes, “analysis is a duty.” Osborne asserts it is critical to improve intelligence analysis at 
the state and local level through the development of a cadre of trained analysts. While her 
work is focused within the law enforcement community, its relevance to Georgia 
Department of Public Health (GDPH), or any other state or local agency involved in 
homeland security is easily understood; analysts are not born, they are made, through 
training and experience (Osborne, 2006). Additionally, she argues that state and local 
personnel numbers dwarf the federal government and so there remains a vast, untapped 
potential to provide intelligence analysis. Additionally, the employment of full-time 
analysts can help professionalize and mature the HSI programs at the SLTT level.  
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C. PLAT QUESTIONS 11, 14, 15, AND 16 
1. Finding Related to Fusion Center Involvement 
The PLAT responses indicate that the involvement of HSI programs with the 
SLTT fusion centers is relatively robust. In this area as well, jurisdictions with written 
plans were more likely to have MOUs with fusion centers, identify HSIAs as being 
assigned to the fusion center, as well as indicating that their HSIAs spent more time at the 
fusion center.  
Fusion centers, “…serve as focal points within the state and local environment for 
the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the 
federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b).  
The majority of the PLAT identified HSI programs indicated a formalized MOU 
existed with their local fusion centers. Establishment of MOUs across organizations helps 
foster a shared set of expectations, formalizes the activity and outcomes at the leadership 
level, and engenders support for the operational implementation of the shared mission. 
Rollins and Connor (2007) state, “It is imperative that the MOA and supporting 
memorandums of understanding (MOU) explicitly reflect the needs of the center and the 
responsibilities of the partnering agencies” (p. 10). An MOU with the fusion center can 
be viewed as yet another step in the formalization and maturation of the HSI program. 
The PLAT suggests that the number of HSIAs actually working in the fusion 
center environment is relatively low. The lack of consistent involvement in the fusion 
center can be problematic for the development and maturation of the HSI capability. 
Participation in the fusion center environment can help facilitate not only the inclusion of 
the public health jurisdiction into the traditional HLS mission, but it can provide a 
valuable two-way communication conduit for broader organizational awareness of the 
current threat environment. As the bulk of the HLS IC capability at the state and local 
level is centered on the fusion center, assigning HSIAs to the fusion center has numerous 
advantages. These advantages are multifocal, including being beneficial to the HSIA’s 
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themselves, the span of organizations that participate in the fusion center environment, 
and the overarching HLS mission. As elucidated in the opening section of this thesis, an 
as yet untapped ability of HSI to inform other segments of the HLS IC, as well as 
contribute to the greater HLS IC mission, exists. The HSIA can be a critical cog in the 
development of inter-organizational trust, especially with public health being a relatively 
new participant in the HLS IC. Simply ensuring the HSIA develops interpersonal 
relationships through face-to-face interaction with other IC analysts can provide a myriad 
of benefits and can ensure continued maturation of the PHI program. The HSIA being 
physically located at the fusion center, when possible, can provide efficiencies related to 
the speed of information sharing and improve the overall analysis process by allowing for 
information fusion to occur during the analysis and product development. The physical 
colocation of HSIAs in the fusion center can also help to establish the trust necessary to 
ensure effective information sharing. Tsai (2002) found, “…informal lateral relations 
become important as they coordinate activities across different organizational units and 
substantially improve the design of a formal organizations” (p. 181), an area in which 
small changes could produce big results. 
Ensuring the HSIA is assigned to the fusion center for the maximum time 
practicable for the jurisdiction can dramatically increase the HSIAs’ skills and 
capabilities related to intelligence analysis, create opportunities for innovation on both 
the public health organizations side, as well as amongst the fusion center partners, and 
ultimately, create entrenchment for the public health organization in the HLS IC arena. 
The majority of public health responses to emergencies and disasters engage 
multiple sectors of public health organizations. By providing an earlier indication of a 
possible emergent threat, the organizations may be better positioned to affect an optimal 
response. Finally, inclusion in the fusion center environment and the intelligence fusion 
process may provide HLS mission benefit to both organizations, but also more mundane 
benefits, such as access to the additional grant funding opportunities, the leveraging of 




The PLAT found that there is likely considerable room for improvement in this area. The 
benefits of greater HSIA interaction with the fusion center in their jurisdiction can 
provide relatively cost free value.  
D. PLAT QUESTIONS 12 AND 13  
1. Findings Related to Analyst Training 
The PLAT demonstrated yet another possible area for improvement related to the 
HSI capability and the training HSIAs receive at the SLTT level. With only three of the 
11 jurisdictions indicating their HSIAs receive formalized training, it would seem that a 
barrier exists to providing HSIAs with training. The literature indicates that analyst 
training is critical to the skillful analysis of intelligence, the overcoming of internal 
biases, the production of optimal, relevant intelligence products, and ultimately, the 
credibility of the analyst amongst peers. As training is so integral to the intelligence 
process, it is a useful metric in assessing the level of maturity and formalization of HSI 
programs. The responses to this question seem to indicate that most HSIAs are not 
provided any formalized level of training. This deficiency can indicate a variety of issues 
exist including, lack of formal training availability, immature HSI programs, lack of 
guidance at the federal or SLTT levels related to the need for training, a emphasis for on 
the job training rather than formal training. Unfortunately, the data set limitations do not 
allow for additional extrapolation. 
E. PLAT QUESTIONS 17, 18 AND 19 
1. Findings Related to Public Health Data Sources for Intelligence 
Analysis 
The responses to Questions 17–19 show that those jurisdictions indicating a HSI 
capability are utilizing multiple data streams as inputs into their intelligence analysis 
process. The analysis also suggests that jurisdictions with a written plan for the HSI 
program incorporate a greater number of data streams into their HSI capability. The  
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inclusion of a greater number of data sets can indicate the potential maturity of HSI 
programs by assessing how extensively they are leveraging the traditional public health 
data streams in the intelligence process. 
F. PLAT QUESTIONS 20, 21 AND 22 
1. Findings Related to Program Oversight and Intelligence Quality 
Assurance  
Ensuring strong oversight of products before final release is necessary to avoid 
issues, such as release of inaccurate reports, intelligence being distributed at 
inappropriate levels of sensitivity or marking (i.e., Law Enforcement Sensitive vs. For 
Official Use Only) and intelligence being released prior to official sanction by the 
authorizing organization. A clear, consistent oversight process can be a marker of 
programmatic maturity and formalization, providing an excellent metric for 
programmatic assessment. The analysis related to Question 20 indicates that those 
jurisdictions with a written plan are more likely to have incorporated a clearance process 
in their HSI program than those without.  
The process by which intelligence is cleared for distribution can be critical. 
Ensuring information related to sources and methods of intelligence collection are 
sufficiently obscured, intelligence being distributed is of sufficient quality to be useful to 
the consumer and that the intelligence product is not distributed before organizational 
leadership has had a chance to receive a brief on the information, are all-important 
components of a mature intelligence program. Identifying a position in a written plan can 
help ensure consistency of process regardless of personnel change. Question 21 
demonstrated that of the responding jurisdictions, those with a written plan were more 
likely to have a position identified to fulfill this role.  
The differentiation of clearance/vetting vs. oversight is an important one to note. 
The process of clearing a product for dissemination is different from oversight in that one 
is intended to ensure a product meets certain criteria, while the other is designed to ensure 
the overall program is compliant with any applicable rules, regulations, laws or other 
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requirements. The analysis of Question 21 noted a marked distinction between those 
jurisdictions with a written plan versus those without. As indicated in the analysis, the 
majority of the jurisdictions that indicated a written plan also identified an oversight 
process while none of the jurisdictions without a written plan responded that they has a 
formal oversight process.  
G. PLAT QUESTIONS 23 AND 25 
1. Findings Related to Counter Intelligence Activities and Compliance 
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
The need for information security and counterintelligence is well defined in the 
literature. A mature, formalized program must account for how it protects its information, 
as well as how it ensures it is not receiving information designed purposefully to distract 
or confuse analysts from potential operations. These counter intelligence considerations 
should be an integral part of a mature HSI program. The analysis related to the PLAT 
also showed that those jurisdictions with a written plan were more likely to incorporate 
counter intelligence considerations into their HSI program, while only one jurisdiction 
without a written plan indicated it had a counter intelligence process in place.  
HIPAA has two components, the HIPAA privacy rule that “provides federal 
protections for personal health information held by covered entities and gives patients an 
array of rights with respect to that information. At the same time, the privacy rule is 
balanced so that it permits the disclosure of personal health information needed for 
patient care and other important purposes…” and the security rule that “…specifies a 
series of administrative, physical, and technical safeguards for covered entities to use to 
assure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health 
information” (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, n.d.). The responsibility of 
a HSI program related to HIPAA should be a critical consideration for HSI programs that 
participate in the HLS IC. As the need to account for HIPAA predates the development of 
the HSI paradigm, it would be expected that most programs had accounted for HIPAA 
compliance in their HSI program. Still, each of the jurisdictions with a written plan 
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indicated they had accounted for HIPAA compliance, while only two of the jurisdictions 
without a written plan indicated HIPAA compliance was part of their HSI program.  
H. PLAT QUESTION 24 
1. Findings Related to Distribution of Unclassified Materials and 
Information 
HSI products would ostensibly need to be distributed to a variety of partner 
agencies and personnel, which may or may not have access to security clearances. The 
need to be able to create less than classified versions of HSI products should be a prime 
consideration for any HSI program. It should be noted that the process for classifying 
information could only occur by select agents at the federal level. Similarly, de-
classifying information must also occur at the federal level. Still, it is important for HSI 
programs at the SLTT level to have a developed capability to create and distribute 
unclassified HSI Products. Of the responding jurisdictions, those with a written plan were 
more likely to indicate a capability to produce unclassified versions of intelligence 
products than those without written plans.  
I. PLAT QUESTIONS 26 AND 27 
1. Findings Related to Funding of HSI Programs and Capabilities  
No specific grant funding is currently available for the development of a HSI 
program at the state and local level. In the current economic climate, especially within the 
public health realm, how HSI programs are currently funding their activities can shed 
insight into the sustainability of existing programs, as well as demonstrate the need for 
dedicated funding sources to ensure the longevity of the programs. Additionally, 
identifying funding sources may help other jurisdictions begin to build their own HSI 
programs. Only three respondents total indicated any identified source of funding for a 
HSI program that would suggest that funding represents a significant barrier to the 
establishment of this capability at the SLTT level. The lack of funding is symptomatic of 
a larger issue in public health. Trust for America’s Health, or TFAH, is a non-profit 
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organization that prepares an annual report on the state of public health preparedness 
across the nation. In their 2011 preparedness report, TFAH found, “…Federal funds for 
state and local preparedness declined by 38 percent from fiscal year (FY) 2005 to 2012 
(adjusted for inflation)…” (Trust for America's Health 2011, p. 5) This reduction in 
federal support indicates a potential critical shortfall as the three jurisdictions, which 
identified a funding source for their HSI capability, all indicated federal funds were used.  
J. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The PLAT findings are supported by the analysis, simply put, jurisdictions with 
written plans more consistently accounted for the literature defined indicators of a 
mature, established intelligence program than those without written plans. While the 
presence of a given criteria in a written plan does not necessarily translate to that activity 
being performed well, or even at all, it is suggestive that the HSI program understands the 
need for the activity and it is at least being conducted in a rudimentary way. The PLAT 
findings were consistent in every variable. While the numbers of respondents indicating 
an HSI capability, whether with a plan or without, represented approximately 17 percent 
of the existing programs, this author posits that the results will extrapolate to the 
capability across all SLTT public health agencies.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FROM HERE TO THERE  
The ability for public health practitioners to plan, prepare for, detect, respond to, 
and mitigate health security threats is more important now than ever before. The speed of 
worldwide modern society allows disease to spread across the globe in hours, rather than 
months. Medical breakthroughs in technology and science that have increased the ability 
to heal, have also brought new opportunities for rogue state actors and terrorists to 
develop, acquire and deploy chemical and biological weapons. Billions of dollars have 
been spent since 9/11 and the October 2001 anthrax attacks to increase this nation’s 
capability to respond to these challenges. Yet, the flaws so prominently highlighted in the 
9/11 Commission report related to failures of imagination and information sharing seem 
to still be very much a problem when it comes to health security threats.  
To be sure, many activities are underway to mitigate issues associated with health 
security intelligence and information. Congress established the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center (NBIC) within the DHS, in August 2007, whose mission is to, 
“…enhance the Nation's capability to integrate biosurveillance efforts” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011b). In 2008, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
established the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) that “….produces 
medical intelligence for global force protection and homeland health protection to 
safeguard U.S. interests worldwide” (United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 2008). 
The DHSS published the National Health Security Strategy in 2009 and the CDC along 
with the DHS’s Office of Health Affairs both have worked diligently to improve the 
federal government’s posture related to chemical and biological threats, along with other 
weapons of mass destruction. However, in their 2011 report on the state of bio-
preparedness in the United States, the WMD Center (2011) stated, “Developing the 
nation’s capabilities to respond to a large-scale bio-event requires capable and informed 
leadership at all levels of government.” The report continued to say, however, that 
“Declining federal support for preparedness activities is translating to shuttering of 
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programs and staff layoffs at state/local health departments and threatens to erode 
progress made in bolstering surveillance” (WMD Center, 2011, p. 24). Additionally, a 
June 2010 GAO Report identified that, “a focal point has not been established with 
responsibility and authority for ensuring the development of a robust, integrated, national 
biosurveillance capability” (Government Accountability Office, 2010). The missing link 
in the chain is the SLTT HSI capability. Strengthening this capability across the nation 
will provide the kind of system-wide resilience, shared development of situational 
awareness and threat detection, and improvement of information sharing across all levels 
of government necessary to protect the nation. At the same time, the organization of these 
activities can provide the impetus for the identification of a lead organization that can 
guide these efforts and become that federal focal point.  
Four fundamental areas of improvement are necessary to promote a nationwide 
HSI capability at the SLTT level and are offered as concrete recommendations from this 
thesis: 1) a national capabilities assessment related to HSI at the SLTT level, 2) an 
identified federal level agency to act as the lead for HSI activities across the nation or the 
development of written HSI plans, 3) concerted national guidance for the establishment 
of SLTT HSI programs, starting with guidance f, and 4) an ability to share SLTT best 
practices in HSI both vertically and horizontally that is inter-jurisdictional with other 
SLTT actors and with the federal government. Each of these four recommendations are 
addressed below. 
B. NATIONAL SLTT HSI CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT 
The development of the PLAT for this thesis can provide a basic template for the 
creation of a national HSI capabilities assessment at the SLTT level. This thesis created a 
crosswalk for the PLAT that can guide the national level assessment. The data collected 
through such an assessment can be used to establish a national baseline of HSI 
capabilities that can be used to begin to address the current capability gaps. Most 
importantly, the assessment will demonstrate what areas SLTT jurisdictions will need 
assistance in related to guidance documents, programmatic templates (such as a planning 
template, integrating critical planning considerations), opportunities and shortfalls related 
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to programmatic funding, analyst training levels and numbers of HSIAs nationally, as 
well as implications related to privacy, HIPAA and the ability to oversee, clear and 
distribute intelligence products. Table 23 describes what might be included, and why, in a 
national assessment of the HSI capability at the SLTT Level. 
 
National Assessment of Health Security Intelligence for State, Local, Tribal and 
Territorial Jurisdictions 
Programmatic Formalization for HSI 
Capability 
 Assessment areas could include formal written plans, 
which can indicate if public health Jurisdictions are 
creating standardized, sustainable programs or simply 
responding to current trends within HLS, Memorandums 
of Agreement or Understanding with other HLS 
agencies to assess how public health jurisdictions are 
currently involved in the intelligence mission, if at all, 
and other markers of formalization.  
Analyst Employment and Training  Assess the human resources commitment being made to 
HSI programs. Important for establishing a baseline for 
HSI Programs nationally, as well as determining 
potential issues with sustainability of programs.  
 Eaneff, among others, outlines the challenges facing non 
traditional producers, users and recipients of intelligence 
products. Employing and training a cadre of dedicated 
analysts, with the proper training, experience and 
credibility to interact in the traditional intelligence realm 
will be necessary to build a sustainable HSI Program 
(Eaneff, 2008).  
 Sims and Gerber (2005) indicate that the training 
analysts receive is a critical component to competency, 
as well as product development. Assessment of this area 
will be important for understanding how improvement 
can be made.  
Fusion Center Involvement and 
Accessibility 
 At the SLTT level, the fusion centers represent the 
primary, formalized HLS intelligence capability. 
Seeking to understand how and in what way HSI is 
being utilized in the fusion centers is necessary. This 
will require fusion center buy in, possibly advocated for 
by the National Fusion Center Association or the DHS 
Intelligence and Analysis State and Local Programs 
Office. 
Privacy and Oversight  Ensuring appropriate privacy controls are in place to 
protect the HSI data will be vital to public acceptance of 
further development of HSI programs. Existing fusion 
center privacy policies may need additional verbiage to 
reflect HSI data. HIPAA and other federal protections 
for information privacy need to be fundamental aspects 
of the HSI program and need to be base lined.  
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National Assessment of Health Security Intelligence for State, Local, Tribal and 
Territorial Jurisdictions 
Funding  Assessing current funding amounts, funding sources and 
support for funding related to HSI may expose critical 
gaps, which can be addressed at the federal, state and 
local level.  
Table 23.   National HSI Assessment Considerations 
In addition to the national assessment identifying potential areas for improvement, 
it could also be used to identify the unique aspects of HSI at the SLTT level. A 
burgeoning recognition exists that SLTT jurisdictions are a largely untapped resource for 
the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence. Yet, little is being done to 
assess what capabilities SLTT organizations and personnel possess that differs from their 
federal level partners. It has largely been assumed that SLTT intelligence programs 
would need the same capabilities and tools as their federal counterparts, and would 
ultimately simply create a localized version of a national intelligence capability. 
Recently, however, it has begun to be recognized that something different might emerge. 
The apparent rise in the “homegrown terrorist,” one who is not on international watch 
lists and who does not face the increased scrutiny from law enforcement at the federal 
level that international terrorists might, demands that SLTT jurisdictions become more 
actively involved in the intelligence and counter intelligence paradigm. Indeed, this 
author’s home jurisdiction, the state of Georgia, recently saw a plot uncovered by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in which a militant group had begun the planning for the 
aerosolized release of the toxin ricin near state and federal government facilities (Jaslow, 
2011).  
A recent report by the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group (2012) supports 
the need for a greater emphasis on SLTT intelligence involvement, stating, “This new 
approach to intelligence—serving local partners' requirements, providing intelligence in 
areas (such as infrastructure) not previously served by intelligence agencies, and 
disseminating information by new means—reflects a transition in how Americans 
perceive national security” (p. 4). By creating a national HSI capability assessment at the 
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SLTT level, identification of current strengths, uncovering of areas of needed 
improvement and recognition of the emergent capabilities of HSI programs can be 
achieved, supported and ultimately, strengthened.  
C. IDENTIFYING A LEAD FEDERAL AGENCY 
Identifying a single entity to coordinate the SLTT HSI capability is critical to the 
long-term success of the program. The failure to provide consistent, evolving guidance, 
which accounts for new developments in the intelligence field, provides coordination 
related to the recognition of emergent threats, seeks to assist in the sourcing of funding 
for programmatic activities, and advocates for the HSI capability at the federal level, 
would significantly impact its continued development. Three primary agencies would 
currently be best suited to provide this type of programmatic leadership, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS), Office of Health Affairs 
(OHA). 
CDC’s mission is to, “… collaborate to create the expertise, information, and 
tools that people and communities need to protect their health—through health 
promotion, prevention of disease, injury and disability, and preparedness for new health 
threats” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011a). The CDC has long been the 
recognized leader, at the federal level, for the nation’s public health efforts. Placing the 
responsibility for creating an overarching national framework for HSI across all levels of 
government, including the SLTT level, would instantly provide credibility within the 
public health community for this activity. The CDC also conducts a myriad of 
biosurveillance activities that would be integral components of a national HSI capability. 
The CDC already manages biosurveillance programs like Bio-Sense and the Early 
Aberration Reporting System (EARS), and the expertise obtained through the operation 
of these two programs could prove invaluable when trying to create and distribute 
guidance related to HSI. Additionally, the CDC has the subject matter experts to support 
SLTT actors when they believe a threat has been identified and are trying to formulate a 
mitigation effort or response.  
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The OHA’s mission is to, “Provide health and medical expertise in support of the 
Department of Homeland Security mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
all hazards impacting the nation’s health security” (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2011c). OHA already supports and manages the BioWatch program, a national 
program that created a detection capability related to aerosolized releases of various 
biological agents. In addition, the OHA manages the National Biosurveillance Integration 
Center, which would provide SLTT HSI programs with a natural information conduit to 
report, share and receive HSI related information and products. The Office of Health 
Affairs also currently supports the portion of the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN), an online portal designed to offer collaboration and information sharing 
related to critical homeland security information with SLTT agencies that deals with 
public health and medical information.  
As previously noted, DHS also recently worked closely with the DOJ to develop 
guidance for fusion centers seeking to incorporate a HSI capability into their 
environments. The OHA would seem well suited to manage a HSI guidance program.  
D. ESTABLISHING NATIONAL LEVEL GUIDANCE 
The establishment of a national HSI capabilities assessment could naturally lead 
to the creation of concerted guidance on which all HSI programs could base their growth 
and maturation. The guidance would need to be developed and distributed by a trusted 
entity, most likely a federal agency that would be able to both support the product, as 
well as sustain it with updated information based on SLTT user feedback and changes in 
intelligence community best practices, national norms and standards in addition to those 
rules, regulations and protocols specific to the proper protection of health related 
information and privacy. The guidance would be based on the results of the National HSI 
capability assessment referenced above and incorporate additional areas of need 
identified by subject matter experts in the public health and intelligence communities.  
Any national guidance document should seek to promote maturation and 
formalization of the HSI programs and processes at the SLTT level. Providing a template 
for development of a written HSI plan, preferably consistent with the guidance provided 
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in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Comprehensive Planning Guidance 
(CPG) 101 (Version 2), would allow for SLTT jurisdictions to begin to adopt a set of 
standardized process that would lend themselves to comparison and assessment across 
jurisdictions (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011b). Currently, the HSI 
planning, both strategic and operational/tactical, occurring at the SLTT level is done with 
little standardization, which makes it difficult to assess programmatic capability or 
effectiveness. Basing the guidance for planning and the templates on CPG 101 would 
help to speed adoption at the SLTT level as it is the most widely recognized federal 
planning guidance document available. Ensuring that the guidance provided a consistent 
framework for programmatic development would provide for the ability to do 
programmatic comparisons related to effectiveness, design, best practices, and so forth. 
Finally, the guidance documents should be provided by a single, well-established and 
recognized federal entity charged with coordinating this task.  
E. INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION 
A key advantage of a mature HSI capability at the SLTT level will be the increase 
in knowledge. Emergent smart practices, increased data collection and analysis and 
heightened visibility related to local health security trends and threats are all possible 
outcomes. Leveraging these aspects of a nationally developed, locally focused capability 
will require a robust information sharing and collaboration environment. Two programs 
exist designed to foster the sharing of best practices and lessons learned, as well as inter-
jurisdictional collaboration; the Lessons Learned Information Sharing System (LLIS), 
and the previously mentioned HSIN.  
LLIS is a secure online portal that “…serves as the national, online network of 
lessons learned, best practices, and innovative ideas for the emergency management and 
homeland security communities” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011c.) This 
online collaboration and sharing system helps jurisdictions share, collaborate and 
disseminate innovative and best practices across the country. Some of the key features of 
the LLIS include the following.  
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 Security: LLIS.gov uses strong encryption and active site monitoring to 
protect all information on the network 
 Verified Members: All LLIS.gov members are verified homeland security 
or emergency response professionals. 
 Member Directory: LLIS.gov members can access the contact information 
of other members through the network's member directory. The advanced 
search function allows members to search the directory by a number of 
different parameters. 
 LLIS.gov Channels: Channels are distinct, secure areas of LLIS.gov 
dedicated to the specific communities and topics of interest and are 
administrated by a designated LLIS.gov member or members. 
 Collaboration Tools: LLIS.gov provides collaboration tools, such as secure 
messaging and a member forum that promote information sharing among 
members in real-time (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011a) 
The LLIS system offers a good mix of information sharing and collaboration 
features and installed user base, while not traditionally being a real time or near real time 
system. However, LLIS is sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
whose mission may not align well with the HSI capability.  
The HISN system is, “…a national secure and trusted web-based portal for 
information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 
private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011a). Some of the key features of the HISN are as 
follows.  
 Document Libraries 
 Instant-messaging tool 
 Web conferencing 
 Incident reporting 
 Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and 
analysis 
 Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical 
visualization 
 Announcements 
 Discussion Boards 
 Task Lists 
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 Requests For Information/For Your Information (RFIs/FYIs) 
 Calendars 
 Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds 
 Online training materials (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011a) 
The HSIN has the advantage of being a platform dedicated to the sharing of 
intelligence related information. As opposed to the LLIS which is designed as a 
knowledge sharing tool. It is also managed and operated by the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, potentially providing greater 
coordination with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which currently supports 
the fusion centers through its state and local programs office. The HSIN suffered some 
early criticism upon its introduction for not considering the needs of SLTT jurisdictions, 
but those issues seem to be resolving as the platform matures.  
Finally, the option of developing a completely new system designed specifically 
for the HSI purpose in mind can be advanced. Advantages to a new system could include 
helping to establish the HSI “brand,” ensuring that the platform was HIPAA compliant 
from its implementation, rather than having to assess an existing system for its 
compliance, and a chance to build a system that could potentially interface with the 
myriad SLTT public health data collection system throughout the country. Potential 
problems with this approach would include which federal agency would sponsor and 
support it, as well as the difficulties of establishing a new system from the ground up 
including such challenges as designing the systems information technology architecture, 
gaining buy in from the user base, and establishing an advisory committee, just to name a 
few.  
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The PLAT was designed to be a qualitative analysis tool. The responses to the 
tool reflected as much, but also imposed limitations on the utility of the responses. Future 
research could include a more quantitatively rigorous assessment of the HSI capability as 
the SLTT level. The primary benefit of a quantitative analysis would be that it could  
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demonstrate performance, rather than simply document what is. Understanding how 
effectively the HSI capability is being conducted at the SLTT level would seem to be the 
next logical step in this area of research.  
G. CONCLUSION  
The health security intelligence capability at the SLTT level is poised to change 
the way public health and the broader medical community participate in the homeland 
security environment. At the same time, a concerted, SLTT focused, national HSI 
capability promises to provide dramatic benefits to the traditional public health 
community as well. From better interaction with first response partners in the law 
enforcement and fire disciplines, to an improved ability to serve the vulnerable and 
underprivileged communities that most need public health, HSI can be more than just 
another tool in the intelligence tool chest. Yet, to achieve these promises, the research 
suggests four things must occur.  
 A federal advocate who can assist with the development of guidance and 
structure for the HSI capability at the SLTT level 
 The maturation and formalization of the HSI programs at the SLTT level, 
starting with the development of written plans for this capability 
 A concerted effort to develop and train HSI analysts who will provide the 
bulk of the innovation and maturation for HSI 
 Dedicated funding must be provided. Whether carved out of existing 
budgets or provided through new federal grants until the HSI capability 
can fully demonstrate its usefulness to SLTT actors and receive greater 
SLTT support 
As the still emergent HLS IC is not afforded the luxury of a long and storied 
tradition of the traditional intelligence community, the multiple successes of military and 
civilian agencies, or the vast budgets both possess, HSI programs will have to be able to 
demonstrate “frugal utility.” In other words, they must continue to mature and formalize 
their programs, within the constraints of current limitations. Doing so will require a 
dedicated and agile SLTT community that finds ways to innovate within existing 
budgets, while seeking new opportunities to fund its activities. Yet, the SLTT 
jurisdictions will need the support of the aforementioned federal lead to truly create a 
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national capability, rather than one existing in pockets of the country as is the case today. 
By starting with a solid foundation of local level planning, national guidance, and 
effective sharing of best practices and lessons learned, public health can leverage the 
collective efforts of the thousands of public health departments throughout the country to 
provide a dynamic HSI capability. This capability can both improve the security of the 
homeland, and provide the public health sector a new level of situational awareness and 
ability to serve its customers.  
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